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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in a rare ruling, held in 
Laska v. Anoka County1 that a day care helper owes a duty to protect 
an infant in day care from foreseeable harm.2  Infant Hannah Laska 
died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) in a licensed day 
care staffed by the provider and her adult daughter, who had 
volunteered to help because her mother was caring for more 
children than her license allowed.3  When an adult offers to help 
take care of the children in an overcrowded licensed day care, a 
parent would think the law would recognize that person owes a 
duty to care for those children.  However, the district court in Laska 
 
       †   Cynthia R. Bartell is a partner at Foley & Mansfield, P.L.L.P.  J.D., William 
Mitchell College of Law, 1994; B.A. History and Humanities, Mankato State 
University.  Heather H. Neubauer is an associate at Foley & Mansfield, P.L.L.P.  
J.D., William Mitchell College of Law, 2002; B.A. Political Science, College of St. 
Benedict.  Ms. Bartell represented Katherine I. Laska throughout the district court 
proceedings.  Ms. Bartell and Ms. Neubauer represented Ms. Laska in her appeal 
to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 
 1. 696 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev. denied, (Minn. Aug. 16, 2005). 
 2. Id. at 139-41. 
 3. Id. at 136-37. 
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found no such duty was owed under Minnesota law.4 
The district court’s ruling was not surprising.  Minnesota 
courts have been cautious in imposing a duty to protect on 
businesses for public policy reasons.5  The issue of whether a duty 
to protect another person is owed typically arises in two kinds of 
cases: (1) when the plaintiff is the victim of a crime on the premises 
of a business or property owner,6 and (2) when a vulnerable person 
is in the custody of another and is deprived of the opportunity for 
self-protection.7  Laska falls in the latter category of cases, in which 
the courts may find a duty to protect arises if there is a special 
relationship between the parties.8  In holding that the day care 
helper in Laska owed no duty to protect Hannah, the district court 
relied on a Minnesota Supreme Court holding that a landlord owes 
no duty to protect a tenant from being murdered.9 
Whether a duty to protect is owed is ultimately a matter of 
public policy.10  By reversing the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the day care helper in Laska, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals demonstrated yet again the value Minnesota courts place 
on protecting vulnerable infants and children.11 
This Article reviews the prior cases in Minnesota in which the 
appellate courts have considered whether a duty to protect was 
 
 4. Order and Memorandum, Laska v. Anoka County, No. C1-03-8400, at 3 
(10th Dist. Ct. Minn. July 6, 2004). 
 5. See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989). 
 6. See id. at 169-70. 
 7. See Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Minn. 1999). 
 8. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (citing Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 130-31; Harper 
v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993)). 
 9. Order and Memorandum, supra note 4 (relying on Funchess v. Cecil 
Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001) (holding landlord not liable for 
tenant’s murder because the landlord-tenant relationship did not create a special 
relationship)). 
 10. See Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 673; Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169. 
 11. See Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (citing Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 
842 (Minn. 1986) (“[S]mall children in a licensed day care facility are a particular 
protected class.”)); see also Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 799 
(Minn. 2005) (holding county who had received reports of suspected abuse of a 
child owed a special duty to protect the child under the Child Abuse Reporting 
Act), overruling Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, 543 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 1996) 
(holding there was no cause of action against a county under the Vulnerable 
Adults Reporting Act for failing to protect a vulnerable adult from financial 
abuse).  As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in Radke, “[o]ur holding . . . 
conforms with the majority of other jurisdictions recognizing a duty on the part of 
social service agencies to investigate reports of child abuse and neglect.”  694 
N.W.2d at 798. 
2
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owed,12 and analyzes how the court of appeals came to the 
conclusion that a duty should be recognized in Laska,13 despite the 
Minnesota courts’ reluctance in the past to find a duty to protect. 
II. THE HISTORY AND CASES LEADING TO LASKA 
Minnesota courts hold, as a general rule, that there is no duty 
to protect another from harm caused by third persons, with narrow 
exceptions recognized in cases involving innkeepers, common 
carriers, those who possess land that is open to the public, and 
those who have custody of another person who is deprived of the 
opportunity of self-protection.14  In those instances, the courts find 
a duty may be owed based on the “special relationship” between the 
parties.15  The following is a review of the cases leading up to Laska, 
in which the Minnesota appellate courts have applied the general 
rule and its exceptions.  As set out below, in only three cases prior 
to Laska did the courts hold that a duty was owed. 
Twenty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in 
Andrade v. Ellefson that a county was in a special relationship with 
the children in a licensed day care giving rise to a duty to protect.16  
In Andrade, two seven-month-old boys suffered head injuries at the 
licensed day care facility.17  The county had received several 
complaints from a neighbor about overcrowding at the day care, 
but the county did little to investigate those complaints.18  The 
injured infants’ parents sued Anoka County, alleging the county 
was negligent in conducting licensing inspections, supervising, and 
investigating complaints about the licensed day care facility.19 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Andrade recognized that 
ordinarily a county does not owe a common law duty to prevent a 
third person from injuring another unless there is a “special 
relation.”20  Moreover, liability may not be imposed on a 
municipality for negligence in performing its “many functions in 
which the government protects the general public” unless the 
 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 391 N.W.2d at 841. 
 17. Id. at 837. 
 18. Id. at 839. 
 19. Id. at 837-38. 
 20. Id. at 841. 
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municipality owed the plaintiff a “special duty.”21  To determine 
whether the county in Andrade owed a duty to the infants in the day 
care different than the duty it owed the public in general, the court 
applied its analysis in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park.22  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court stated the decisive factor giving rise to a 
special duty in Andrade was the statutes and regulations governing 
day care licensing, which the court held were enacted to protect 
the “uniquely vulnerable” children in licensed day care facilities.23 
[The Public Welfare Licensing Act] clearly mandates that 
small children in a licensed day care facility are a 
particular protected class.  The class consists of uniquely 
vulnerable persons: small children, often infants, left by 
their working parents in a home other than their own, 
and left in the care of another person for some period of 
less than 24 hours of the day.24 
The supreme court concluded the “statutory mandate to 
protect a certain class . . . [was] so overwhelmingly dominant that 
we have no difficulty in finding a ‘special relation’ exists between 
the county and the small children in the day care homes that it 
inspects for licensure.”25  The court found that the operation of 
child day care facilities presents “a high risk of liability exposure,” 
which in turn “underscores the need for adequate inspection.”26  
 
 21. Id. 
 22. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).  The supreme court in Cracraft applied a 
four-part test to determine if a municipality “assumes a special duty owed to 
certain members of the public” that is distinguishable from the “many functions in 
which the government protects the general public.”  Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 841.  
Factors the court considers include: “(1) actual knowledge by the municipality of 
the dangerous condition, (2) reasonable reliance on specific representations of 
the municipality, (3) a statutory duty for municipal protection of a particular class, 
and (4) municipal action which increases the risk of harm.”  Id. (citing Cracraft, 
279 N.W.2d at 806-07). 
 23. Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 842. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 843. 
 26. Id.  Justice Rosalie Wahl, concurring specially, put it this way: 
The rules governing the licensing of family day care homes are detailed 
and comprehensive . . . .  When a county licenses a child care facility, it 
represents to parents that these demanding standards have been met.  
This is not a general representation, but a representation that this 
specific licensee is a suitable person to have charge of children and that 
this particular facility provides adequate care and surroundings for young 
children . . . .  Licensing standards are of critical importance to parents 
seeking adequate, nurturing child care and parents rely on enforcement 
of these rules.  Parents who require child care have a special need to rely 
on the representation of quality indicated by licensing . . . .  There is no 
4
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Based on its finding of a special relationship between the county 
and the children in licensed day care facilities, the court held the 
county owed a special duty to the plaintiffs in Andrade.27 
The Minnesota Supreme Court next held a duty to protect 
arose in 1989 in Erickson v. Curtis Investment Co.28  In Erickson, the 
plaintiff, who was a customer of a parking ramp owned and 
operated by the defendants, was assaulted and raped by a third 
party while in that parking ramp.29  The court considered whether 
the defendants owed a duty to protect the customer from criminal 
assaults by third parties.30  The court recognized a duty to protect 
depends on the relationship of the parties and the foreseeability of 
the harm.31  The court stated: 
If the law is to impose a duty on A to protect B from C’s 
criminal acts, the law usually looks for a special 
relationship between A and B, a situation where B has in 
some way entrusted his or her safety to A and A has 
accepted that entrustment.  This special relationship also 
assumes that the harm represented by C is something that 
A is in a position to protect against and should be 
expected to protect against.32 
The court in Erickson noted that, “the law has been cautious 
and reluctant to impose a duty to protect” on businesses.33  
“Ultimately, the question is one of policy.”34  The court considered 
the defendants’ policy arguments that law enforcement is a 
government function and a jury would have to speculate to 
conclude additional security would have prevented the crime.35  
The court also considered that the parking lot was in a downtown 
metropolitan area, was dimly lit with low ceilings, and was full of 
unoccupied cars—conditions which attracted criminal activity.36  
The court concluded these characteristics presented a 
 
other source through which parents can get reliable information about 
this essential service than from the county, the licensing and inspection 
authority. 
Id. at 844 (Wahl, J., concurring specially). 
 27. Id. at 843 (majority opinion). 
 28. 447 N.W.2d 165, 169-70 (Minn. 1989). 
 29. Id. at 166. 
 30. Id. at 168-70. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 168. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 169. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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unique opportunity for criminals and their criminal 
activities . . . which to some degree is different from that 
presented out on the street and in the neighborhood 
generally.  We do not think the law should say the 
operator of a parking ramp owes no duty to protect its 
customers.  Some duty is owed.37 
Though the court initially stated the existence of a duty to 
protect from criminal harm depended on the relationship of the 
parties, the court did not analyze the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendants.38 
The court also ruled in Erickson that the security company 
hired to patrol the ramp owed the plaintiff a duty to protect her 
from the criminal assault.39  The security company argued it did not 
owe a duty to the plaintiff, who was a customer of the parking ramp 
and not the adjoining hotel, which hired the security company.40  
The court reasoned the security company undertook a duty to 
patrol the entire ramp and all of its customers, including the 
plaintiff.41  The court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
324A to state that liability is imposed “on a defendant who 
undertakes for another (whether gratuitously or for a 
consideration) to perform a duty owed by the other to a third 
person.”42  Thus, when the security company was hired to protect 
the hotel’s customers, it also undertook a duty to protect the 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. The court in Erickson did not cite or rely on its ruling in Andrade.  Instead, 
the court relied on two of its prior rulings and a court of appeals ruling in cases 
where plaintiffs tried to hold defendants liable for their failure to protect plaintiffs 
from criminal acts of third parties.  Id. at 168 (citing Pietila v. Congdon, 362 
N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1985) (holding defendant trustees as possessors of land 
did not owe duty to prevent murder of nurse of trust beneficiary in beneficiary’s 
home, reasoning “[i]nasmuch as no police force has ever achieved that goal, the 
plaintiff cannot intend the imposition of an absolute obligation to prevent all 
crime”)); Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 43 N.W.2d 17 
(1952) (holding hospital owed a duty to protect its patient from assault and injury 
when it knew or should have known another patient who was staggering and 
intoxicated was likely to injure other patients, taking into account the vulnerability 
of the patient and foreseeability of the danger); Roettger v. United Hosps. of St. 
Paul, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming denial of motion for 
new trial because there was sufficient evidence the hospital’s failure to provide 
adequate security was a direct cause of patient’s injury from assault by hospital 
trespasser)). 
 39. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 170. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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parking ramp’s customers.43 
Following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Erickson, 
Minnesota courts have routinely rejected claims of a duty to 
protect.  For example, in 1993 in Harper v. Herman, the supreme 
court considered whether a boat owner owed his social guest, a 
twenty-year-old man who was injured when he dove from a boat 
into shallow water, a duty to tell the guest that the water 
surrounding the boat was too shallow to dive.44  The guest argued 
that a special relationship required the boat owner to protect him 
when the boat owner, “as a social host, allowed an inexperienced 
diver on his boat.”45  The court recognized that generally a special 
relationship giving rise to a duty “is only found on the part of 
common carriers, innkeepers, possessors of land who hold it open 
to the public, and persons who have custody of another person 
under circumstances in which that other person is deprived of 
normal opportunities of self-protection.”46  The court further noted 
that in instances where a duty is owed because someone has 
custody of another person, “the plaintiff is typically in some respect 
particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, 
correspondingly, holds considerable power over the plaintiff’s 
welfare . . . .  Fairness in such cases thus may require the defendant 
to use his power to help the plaintiff, based upon the plaintiff’s 
expectation of protection . . . .”47 
The supreme court in Harper found that the plaintiff was 
neither vulnerable nor lacked the ability to protect himself.48  The 
court distinguished its prior holding in Andrade.  “Andrade involved 
a group of plaintiffs who had little opportunity to protect 
themselves, children in day care, and a defendant to whom the 
plaintiffs looked for protection.  In this case, Harper was not 
deprived of opportunities to protect himself, and [the boat owner] 
was not expected to provide protection.”49 
The Minnesota Supreme Court next considered the duty to 
protect in 1995 in Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. 499 N.W.2d 472, 473-74 (Minn. 1993). 
 45. Id. at 474. 
 46. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)). 
 47. Id. at 474 n.2 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAWS OF TORTS § 56, at 374 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 48. Id. at 474. 
 49. Id. at 475. 
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Duluth, when it again found no duty was owed.50  The decedent 
committed suicide while she was a resident of a Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA) housing facility in Duluth, 
Minnesota.51  The decedent had rented a room from the YWCA on 
a monthly basis.52  The facility had a front desk that was staffed 
twenty-four hours a day and handled mail and incoming calls for 
residents who did not have private phones in their rooms.53  The 
YWCA also patrolled the halls of the facility during nighttime 
hours.54  Decedent, who had a borderline personality disorder and 
was being treated by a psychiatrist, committed suicide in her 
room.55  There was some evidence the YWCA was aware the 
decedent was in distress.56  The supreme court reasoned that even if 
it assumed the YWCA ran its housing facility like a hotel and a 
special relationship was thus created similar to that recognized 
between an innkeeper and guest, that did not necessarily mean the 
YWCA had a duty to protect decedent from harming herself.57  
Though the court recognized a hospital may have a duty to protect 
patients from foreseeable suicides, the relationship between the 
decedent and the YWCA “bore little resemblance to the caretaking 
relationship of a hospital toward its patients . . . .”58  The YWCA was 
not aware of decedent’s medical history, did not provide services or 
have the expertise to treat mental health problems, and did not 
have custody or control of decedent.59  Additionally, decedent had 
not entrusted her care to the YWCA, which in turn did not agree to 
care for her and was not in a position to protect her from 
committing suicide.60  The supreme court concluded “that the 
relationship between the YWCA and [decedent] lacked the degree 
of dependence and control necessary to form a special relationship 
which created a duty on the part of the YWCA to prevent 
[decedent’s] suicide.”61 
 
 50. 539 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Minn. 1995). 
 51. Id. at 790. 
 52. Id. at 791. 
 53. Id. at 791 n.1. 
 54. Id. at 790-91. 
 55. Id. at 791. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 792. 
 58. Id. at 793. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.; see also Bigos v. Kluender, 611 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that a landlord had no duty to warn a tenant not to grill items on balcony 
8
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Also in 1995, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized a 
duty of care was owed to a child who died of diabetes because he 
did not receive medical care.  In Lundman v. McKown, an eleven-
year-old child suffered juvenile onset diabetes but did not receive 
any medical treatment because the Christian Scientists who cared 
for him (including his mother) instead believed in providing 
spiritual treatment through prayer.62  Because the child’s mother 
and stepfather realized he was very ill, they hired a specially trained 
Christian Science practitioner to provide spiritual treatment.63  This 
practitioner never came to the child’s house, but was paid to pray 
for the child.64  When the child’s condition worsened, the mother 
and stepfather contacted a committee member of the Christian 
Science Church, and the committee member in turn contacted the 
mother church of the Christian Science religion regarding the 
child’s illness.65  The mother also hired a Christian Science nurse 
who came to the home and provided prayer and care to the child.66  
After four days of displaying increasingly worsening symptoms of 
juvenile onset diabetes, the child died without ever receiving any 
medical treatment because such treatment was against his mother’s 
and stepfather’s religious beliefs.67 
The court of appeals held that the mother of the child had a 
duty to protect her vulnerable child from harm because she had a 
special relationship with the child.68  The court of appeals also 
analyzed whether a duty was owed by: (1) the child’s stepfather, (2) 
the Christian Science nurse, (3) the Christian Science practitioner 
hired to pray for the child, (4) a church official who reported the 
child’s illness to the church, (5) a Christian Science nursing home, 
and (6) the Christian Science church.69 
The court ruled the stepfather had a special relationship with 
the child because he assisted the child by calling the church 
committee member, carrying the child to and from meals, and 
attending to the helpless child’s needs.70  The court stated: 
 
that started fire because courts are reluctant to impose liability for self-inflicted 
harm). 
 62. 530 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 814, 822-23. 
 65. Id. at 814. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 813-15. 
 68. Id. at 820. 
 69. Id. at 820-26. 
 70. Id. at 820-21. 
9
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“Independent of [the stepfather’s] conduct during [the child’s] 
final illness, we believe there also is a presumption that ‘custodial’ 
stepparents (and ‘visitation’ stepparents during visitation) assume 
special relationship duties to stepchildren.”71  The court concluded 
the stepfather “was obligated to put [the child’s] interests first—
above and beyond [the mother’s] interest in exercising her 
religious beliefs,” and was obligated to “step forward to rescue” the 
child.72 
The court found the Christian Science nurse had a special 
relationship with the child because the child was helpless and she 
accepted the responsibility of caring for him, by reading him 
prayers, comforting him, cleaning him, and attending to his 
physical care.73 
Both indicia of a “special relationship” apply: [the nurse] 
had significant “custody or control” of [the child] under 
circumstances where [the child] lacked even his limited 
minor’s capacity for self-protection—that is why mother 
hired [the nurse]—and she accepted the responsibility to 
care for [the child] and to protect him by providing 
professional services in return for cash wages.74 
The nurse argued she had no duty to advise medical treatment 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 821; c.f. Sunnarborg v. Howard, 581 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997).  In Sunnarborg, the court of appeals considered whether a minor’s uncle was 
in a special relationship with her, which required him to protect her from being 
sexually abused by her father.  581 N.W.2d at 398.  The uncle had assumed 
custody of the minor child in his own home, along with responsibilities for making 
sure she was cared for and attended school.  Id. at 399.  Subsequently, the minor’s 
father moved in with the uncle and began sexually abusing his minor daughter.  
Id.  The uncle continued to care for the child while the father lived in his home.  
Id.  The court of appeals found the uncle did not owe any duty to protect the child 
from her father.  Id. at 399.  The court reasoned there had been no legal 
restriction or termination of the father’s parental rights.  Id.  Once the father 
moved into the uncle’s home, the uncle “was in the position of a social host.”  Id.  
The court further reasoned the father had not imposed any responsibility on the 
uncle to protect the minor child from her father, nor had the uncle agreed to 
accept such responsibility.  Id.  The court therefore concluded that when the 
father was present, no special relationship existed between the minor child and 
her uncle.  Id.  The court distinguished Lundman on grounds the stepfather in 
that case was married to the child’s mother, and the other defendants in Lundman 
who were found to owe a duty had a contractual relationship with the child.  Id.  
The court of appeals in Sunnarborg affirmed the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the uncle on grounds he owed no duty to protect the minor child from 
being sexually molested by her father.  Id. at 399-400. 
 73. Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 821-22. 
 74. Id. at 821. 
10
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because that was “antithetical to Christian Science nursing.”75  She 
further argued the child’s parents, not the nurse, decided what 
care the child should receive.76  The court rejected both arguments, 
reasoning the nurse’s duty was “to make [the child’s] welfare her 
paramount interest.”77  “During a good part of her involvement, 
though it was brief, a telephone call to involve a provider of 
conventional medical care would likely have led to the 
administration of insulin and would likely have saved [the child’s] 
life.”78 
The Lundman court next considered the duty owed by the 
Christian Science practitioner hired to pray for the child.79  The 
practitioner argued his only duty was to pray for the child.80  The 
court disagreed because the practitioner “accepted a responsibility 
to serve [the child] and thereafter, through conversations with the 
mother and nurse, held considerable power over [the child’s] 
welfare.”81  The court noted the practitioner was in continuous 
contact with the mother and nurse from the time he was hired until 
moments before the child’s death.82  The court concluded the 
practitioner “accepted a professional’s responsibility for [the 
child’s] healthcare.”83 
By contrast, the Lundman court found no duty was owed to the 
child by the Christian Science church official who received three 
telephone calls about the child’s health condition and notified 
church headquarters.84  The court found no special relationship 
between the church official and the child because “neither of the 
two definitions of a ‘special relationship’ applies; [the church 
official] never accepted ‘power’ over [the child], [nor did he 
assume] a responsibility to protect him.”85  Rather, the church 
official “declined any personal obligation he might otherwise have 
assumed” when he told the child’s parents to call a professional 
when they told him they wanted Christian Science care.86  
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 822. 
 78. Id. at 821. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 822. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 823. 
 86. Id.; see also H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittenmore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 706-09 
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Moreover, the church official was not in steady contact with the on-
scene caregivers, and was not hired to pray for the child, but 
instead simply had knowledge of his illness.87  “Mere knowledge of 
an illness, without either an assumed obligation of care or prior 
relationship, is insufficient to create a special relationship . . . .  To 
base duty on mere knowledge with power would implicate 
neighbors, grandparents, and friends.”88  The court noted that 
basing liability on knowledge and power alone, without first 
establishing a legal duty was owed, “reduces the question of 
negligence into a ‘but for’ causation test,” reasoning which has 
been rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court.89 
The court in Lundman similarly found no duty was owed by the 
Christian Science nursing home facility that had received several 
telephone calls regarding the child’s care and sent a nurse to care 
for him.90  The court reasoned the nursing home “never assumed 
‘considerable power’ over [the child’s] welfare,” nor did it accept 
“any professional responsibility to serve [the child], but simply—
without compensation—provided suggestions for care, in contrast 
to [the nurse] and [the practitioner], the professionals who were 
hired to actually care for [the child] on an ongoing basis.”91  The 
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the nurse sent by the 
nursing home was an agent of the nursing home because the 
nursing home did not have any right to control the nurse’s actions, 
the nurse could have refused the referral, there was no contact 
between the child’s parents or the nurse and the nursing home 
after the nurse was engaged, and the nursing home was not paid 
for the services the nurse provided to the child.92 
Finally, the court in Lundman found no duty was owed to the 
child by the Christian Science church.93  Plaintiff argued the 
Christian Science nurse and practitioner were agents of the church, 
 
(Minn. 1996) (holding there was no special relationship between trailer park 
manager and children who were residents of the trailer park in part because the 
manager rejected the entrustment of their care when she told them to report 
sexual molestation by another resident to their parents). 
 87. Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 823. 
 88. Id. at 823-24. 
 89. Id. at 824 (citing Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Minn. 
1994)). 
 90. Id. at 824-25. 
 91. Id. at 824. 
 92. Id. at 824-25. 
 93. Id. at 825. 
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and the church authorized their acts.94  The court rejected this 
argument on grounds that there “was no evidence that the church 
had a right to control the means and manner” in which the nurse 
and the practitioner cared for the child.95  The court found that an 
agency relationship was not created between the church and the 
nurse and the practitioner simply because the church listed their 
names in an advertisement.96  The court reasoned that, though the 
Christian Science church could advise its nurses and practitioners 
that they should suggest medical care when a child’s life is 
threatened, “mere power is not sufficient for the imposition of a 
duty.”97 
The Minnesota Supreme Court next addressed the question of 
whether a special relationship resulting in a duty to protect arose in 
the 1996 case of H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, when the court 
ruled no duty was owed.98  In Whittemore, children in a trailer park 
reported to the trailer park manager that another tenant of the 
trailer park was sexually assaulting them.99  The tenant previously 
told the manager that he had been convicted of a sexual crime in 
the past.100  Instead of reporting the children’s complaints, the 
manager told the children to tell their parents.101  The children 
reported the assaults to their parents a few weeks later.102  The 
parents sued the owners and operators of the trailer park, arguing 
the manager had a special relationship with their children and 
owed a duty to protect them from sexual assaults by another tenant 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 826.  The court additionally reasoned: 
[A] church is not a lawn-mower manufacturer that can be found 
negligent in a products liability case for failing to affix a warning sticker 
near the blades.  As previously noted, the constitutional right to religious 
freedom includes the authority of churches—not courts—to 
independently decide matters of faith and doctrine, and for a church as 
an institution to believe and speak what it will.  When it comes to 
restraining religious conduct, it is the obligation of the state, not a church 
and its agents, to impose and communicate the necessary limitations—to 
attach the warning sticker.  A church always remains free to espouse 
whatever religious belief it chooses; it is the practices of its adherents that may 
be subject to state sanctions. 
Id.  
 98. 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996). 
 99. Id. at 707. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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because they were vulnerable children.103  The supreme court held 
that the manager did not have a special relationship with the 
children, and thus, did not owe them a duty.104  The court reasoned 
that, unlike the vulnerable day care infants in Andrade, the trailer 
park manager in Whittemore did not have custody or control of the 
vulnerable children who were being molested.105  The court further 
reasoned that, unlike the defendants in Erickson, the manager did 
not accept the entrustment of the children’s care, but rather 
rejected that entrustment when she told the children to tell their 
parents about the sexual assaults.106 
The dissent in Whittemore argued that a special relationship 
giving rise to a duty to protect should be found, stating: 
In order to reach its conclusion, the majority opinion 
reads Erickson to impose a greater duty of care and 
responsibility on the owner of a parking ramp, relative to 
its patrons, than upon adults to whom children report 
criminal sexual abuse.  In my view, the majority reads the 
“parking ramp case” too narrowly, essentially limiting the 
holding of Erickson to its facts.  While in Erickson we held 
that a special duty arose because of the unique 
circumstances that exist in a parking ramp which gave rise 
to the risk of crime, a risk which the parking ramp 
operator was in a position to deter, nothing in the 
opinion suggests that those were the only types of special 
circumstances which might give rise to a duty. 
I conclude, as did the court of appeals in the present 
case, that there are unusual circumstances, equal to those 
in Erickson, though different, that give rise to a duty on the 
part of the mobile home park.  These special 
circumstances include: the reports to the park manager by 
the children that they were being abused; the inability of 
the children to protect themselves against the ongoing 
criminal assault; the high level of protection against child 
sexual abuse afforded by state public policy; and the 
 
 103. Id. at 709. 
 104. Id. at 709-10. 
 105. Id. at 708-09.  The trailer park manager did not provide any care for these 
children at any time, nor did the parents drop them off at the manager’s 
residence expecting that she would provide their children with care.  See also 
D.E.L. v. Blue Earth County, 2004 WL 728090, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2004) 
(holding foster parents, not county, had control of foster child, therefore the 
county owed no duty to protect). 
 106. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708-09. 
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statutory provision that requires that there be a resident 
caretaker in each mobile home park, with an obligation to 
“be readily available at all times in case of emergency.”107 
The Whittemore majority rejected these arguments by the 
dissent, reasoning “[a]n adult who does not stand in a caretaking 
relationship with a child should not have thrust upon her an ill-
defined legal responsibility to take ‘some reasonable action’—as 
suggested by the dissent—because the child chose to report 
mistreatment to her.”108  Though the majority recognized the 
emotional appeal of the dissent’s conclusion that a special 
relationship existed in Whittemore, the majority concluded “none of 
the bases cited by the dissent for finding a special relationship even 
remotely falls within the parameters this court has carefully carved 
out as the outer boundaries for this exception to the common law 
rule . . . .”109 
In the 1999 case of Gilbertson v. Leininger, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that homeowners did not have a special 
relationship with a social guest who suffered a head injury at the 
defendants’ home and therefore, the defendants owed no duty to 
act for the guest’s protection.110  Plaintiff Gilbertson was a 
Thanksgiving guest at the home of defendant.111  She drank a bottle 
of wine and a beer throughout the day and evening, and stayed 
overnight at defendants’ home.112  The next morning when 
Gilbertson awoke, defendants noticed she had blood under her 
nose and had defecated in her pants.113  They concluded she was 
still intoxicated.114  Gilbertson stayed at the defendants’ home 
throughout that day, sleeping.115  When she awoke later in the 
afternoon and still had not cleaned herself up, defendants called a 
nurse who told them to stimulate Gilbertson by giving her caffeine 
 
 107. Id. at 710 (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 108. Id. at 709 (majority opinion). 
 109. Id. (quoting Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) 
(defining these parameters to include “common carriers, innkeepers, possessors of 
land who hold it open to the public, and persons who have custody of another 
person under circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal 
opportunities of self-protection”)). 
 110. 599 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Minn. 1999). 
 111. Id. at 129. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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and cleaning her up.116  Eventually another friend came to the 
defendants’ home, saw Gilbertson’s condition, and told them to 
call 911, which they did.117  Gilbertson was taken to the hospital, 
where she was diagnosed with a head injury requiring surgery.118  
Gilbertson sued the defendants on the theory that they should have 
sought medical treatment for her earlier.119  She claimed the 
defendants “had custody of her under circumstances in which she 
was deprived of normal opportunities of self-protection,” thereby 
creating a duty to protect.120 
The supreme court disagreed, noting the defendants did not 
have custody or control of Gilbertson, who was “merely a dinner 
guest who happened to stay overnight.”121  The court reasoned 
Gilbertson did not “entrust her health” to defendants, and they 
“did not accept responsibility to care for Gilbertson’s physical 
condition.”122  The court further recognized that Gilbertson’s head 
injury would have been difficult to diagnose, even by doctors, and 
that the symptoms mimic those of intoxication.123  Under those 
circumstances, the defendants were “not in a position to protect 
Gilbertson,” nor did she reasonably expect such protection.124  The 
supreme court concluded defendants owed no duty to protect 
Gilbertson.125 
Finally, in 2001, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the 
duty owed by a landlord to a tenant to protect the tenant from 
criminal harm in the case of Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp.126  The 
court found that the landlord owed no duty.127  In Funchess, 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 130. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 131. 
 121. Id.; see Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 
N.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Minn. 1995) (“[The] duty [to protect] has most often been 
found where an institution such as a hospital or jail has physical custody and 
control of the person to be protected.”); Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 
(Minn. 1993) (finding no special relationship when the defendant did not hold 
“considerable power over [plaintiff’s] welfare”). 
 122. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131; see H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 
N.W.2d 705, 708-09 (Minn. 1996). 
 123. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131. 
 124. Id. at 131-32. 
 125. Id. at 132. 
 126. 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001). 
 127. Id. at 676. 
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unidentified intruders murdered the decedent in his apartment.128  
Though the landlord was required by decedent’s lease agreement 
to maintain common areas in a safe condition and make repairs 
within a reasonable amount of time, there was evidence the security 
locks and intercoms on decedent’s apartment building were not in 
working order in the weeks prior to his death.129  The trustee for 
decedent’s heirs sued the landlord on the theory that his 
negligence in failing to repair the locks and intercoms resulted in 
the intruders being able to enter decedent’s apartment building 
and murder him.130 
The court noted the general common law rule that a person 
has no duty to protect others from harm caused by third parties 
unless there is a special relationship between the parties and the 
harm is foreseeable.131  The court recognized the question is 
ultimately one of public policy.132  It stated a duty to protect may be 
imposed on the landlord if (1) decedent entrusted his safety to the 
landlord; (2) the landlord accepted the entrustment; and (3) the 
landlord was “in a position to, and should have been expected to 
protect [decedent] from criminal attack.”133  The court first found 
there was no special relationship between the landlord and 
decedent in Funchess, rejecting the conclusion of the court of 
appeals that the landlord had exclusive control over building 
security, thereby creating a special relationship.134  The court also 
was not persuaded that the third element of the test, that the 
landlord was in a position to and should have been expected to 
 
 128. Id. at 668. 
 129. Id. at 669-70. 
 130. Id. at 671. 
 131. Id. at 673. 
 132. Id.  The court noted: 
In deciding whether a special relationship exists, we look to the following 
policy considerations: crime prevention is essentially a government 
function, not a private duty; criminals are unpredictable and bent on 
defeating security measures; and because the issue arises where existing 
security precautions have failed, the question will always be whether 
further security measures were required and a property owner will have 
little idea what is expected of him or her.  Further we must consider the 
relative costs and benefits of imposing a duty—the level of risk balanced 
against the cost of providing the security that will reduce the risk to that 
level. 
Id. at 673 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 133. Id. at 673; see Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 
1989). 
 134. Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 674. 
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protect its tenant, was satisfied either.135  The court concluded that 
there was no special relationship between the landlord and tenant 
imposing on the landlord a duty to protect.136 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Funchess also rejected the 
conclusion of the court of appeals that, by providing some security 
measures, the landlord assumed a duty to maintain those security 
measures already undertaken to protect decedent.137  The court 
recognized the rule that “one who voluntarily assumes a duty will 
be liable for damages resulting from failure to use reasonable 
care.”138  As a matter of first impression, the court noted other 
jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether landlords should be 
subject to liability because they have taken reasonable measures to 
provide security to tenants.139  It stated: 
We are not inclined to establish a rule that would 
discourage landlords from improving security.  
Transforming a landlord’s gratuitous provision of security 
measures into a duty to maintain those measures and 
subjecting the landlord to liability for all harm occasioned 
by a failure to maintain that security would tend to 
discourage landlords from instituting security measures 
for fear of being held liable for the actions of a criminal.140 
The supreme court reasoned that even if the outside security 
door was malfunctioning, other security measures were in place, 
including a security guard and the lock on the door to decedent’s 
apartment, making it impossible for the court to conclude, as 
required by Restatement section 323, that the landlord should have 
recognized the outdoor security door was necessary for decedent’s 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 675. 
 138. Id. at 674 (citing Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 295, 232 N.W.2d 818, 
822 (1975)).  The court further recognized the Restatement rule governing an 
undertaking of a duty, as follows: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services 
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of 
the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking, if 
(a)   his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the 
undertaking. 
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)). 
 139. Id. at 674-75. 
 140. Id. at 675. 
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protection.141  The court decided the duty to maintain the security 
locks and the intercom system did not result in liability being 
imposed on the landlord for the acts of the criminals who entered 
decedent’s apartment and murdered him.142  In sum, the supreme 
court concluded that the landlord owed no duty to protect 
decedent from his killers.143 
In only three cases in the past twenty years—Andrade, Erickson, 
and Lundman—have the Minnesota appellate courts found a duty 
to protect was owed.  In Andrade and Lundman, the duty arose 
because the defendants were in a special relationship with 
vulnerable children.  The court in Erickson found a duty to protect 
parking ramp customers from criminal harm arose as a matter of 
public policy. 
Against this backdrop, the court of appeals decided the Laska 
case.  In Laska, the issue was whether the adult daughter of a 
licensed day care provider owed a duty to an infant in the day care 
program when the daughter agreed to help her mother, the 
provider, care for the children during a period when the mother 
would be over her licensed capacity in terms of the number and 
ages of children permitted in her day care program.144 
III. THE LASKA DECISION 
Infant Hannah Laska was born in June of 2000.145  She began 
attending provider Joyce Jeffrey’s day care facility in July of 2000.146  
Jeffrey had a C2 day care license that allowed her to have a 
maximum of twelve children, of which no more than two children 
could be infants (under twelve months) or toddlers (twelve to thirty 
months), of which only one could be an infant.147  Because Jeffrey 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Laska v. Anoka County, 696 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev. 
denied, (Minn. Aug. 16, 2005). 
 145. Id. at 136. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.  Since 1983, Jeffrey had held a license from Anoka County to operate a 
day care out of her home.  Id.  Anoka County is authorized by the State of 
Minnesota to provide such day care licenses pursuant to the promulgated 
administrative rules for such activities under Minnesota Statutes section 245A.03, 
subdivision 1 and section 245A.16, subdivision 1.  Minnesota Rules 9502.0367 
establishes certain child/adult ratios and age-distribution restrictions for the 
various licenses the State provides to day care providers.  Based on these 
regulations set forth in the rules, in order for Jeffrey to have an additional infant 
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was going to have one toddler more than her license permitted, 
Jeffrey applied to Anoka County for a capacity/age distribution 
variance on August 15, 2000.148  This variance allowed Jeffrey to 
have an additional toddler for a ten-day period, between August 21, 
2000, and September 3, 2000.149  As an alternative measure to 
ensure the health, safety, and protection of the children in the 
Jeffrey day care facility during the variance period, Jeffrey stated on 
her variance application that her adult daughter, Ginger Flohaug, 
would be living at home with her during the variance period and 
would be helping her care for the children.150  Anoka County 
granted Jeffrey’s capacity/age distribution variance on August 17, 
2000.151 
Flohaug was Jeffrey’s twenty-three-year-old daughter, who had 
grown up in her family’s home surrounded by Jeffrey’s day care 
children since 1983.152  Flohaug had assisted Jeffrey with the care of 
the children and had been Jeffrey’s helper over the years.153  
Growing up, Flohaug had played with the children, fed them, and 
changed their diapers.154  On several prior occasions, Jeffrey had 
listed Flohaug as a helper on variance applications.155 
 
or toddler, she was required to identify specific measures that would ensure that 
the health and safety of the children would be protected—in this case, that a 
second caregiver (her daughter) would be present.  See MINN. R. 9502.0335, subp. 
8a (2005); MINN. R. 9502.0367.  The issue of the ratio of adults to children in 
licensed day care facilities has been central to the issue of child care safety since 
the Minnesota Department of Human Services promulgated rules regulating day 
care facilities.  See, e.g., Handle With Care, Inc. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 406 
N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1987) (involving challenge to day care regulations adopted by 
the Department of Human Services despite the Department’s failure to comply 
with statutory study and report requirements). 
 148. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136.  Under Minnesota Rule 9502.0335, subpart 8, 
day care providers may request a variance to allow them to exceed their license 
capacity under certain circumstances. 
 149. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136. 
 150. Id.  The regulations require a provider who applies for a capacity variance 
to state alternative measures that would be provided to ensure the health, safety, 
and protection of the children in the day care.  MINN. R. 9502.0335, subp. 8a.  
Jeffrey wrote on the variance request that “I will have good, reliable help.  My 
daughter is a [physical education] and health teacher who loves kids.”  Laska, 696 
N.W.2d at 136. 
 151. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136. 
 152. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 4, Laska v. Anoka County, 696 N.W.2d 
133 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (No. A04-1661), 2004 WL 3403980. 
 153. Id. at 5. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136.  In 1991 and 1992, Jeffrey had listed Flohaug as 
a helper on her variance requests.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at AA 0116-
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On August 20, 2000, Flohaug had moved back home after 
graduating from college.156  Prior to Flohaug moving back home, 
Jeffrey had asked Flohaug for assistance with her day care children 
during the variance period.157  Flohaug had stated to Jeffrey that 
she would be “around to help” with Jeffrey’s day care.158  Jeffrey 
relayed Flohaug’s agreement to help with the day care children 
during the variance period to the county social worker during a re-
licensing inspection at Jeffrey’s day care on August 14, 2000.159 
On August 21, 2000, the first date of the variance, Flohaug was 
present at the Jeffrey day care in the morning.160  She left the day 
care around 11:00 a.m. for a job interview and did not return to the 
day care until two to three hours later.161  Katherine Laska brought 
her daughter, infant Hannah, to the Jeffrey day care around noon, 
before Flohaug had returned from her job interview.162  Jeffrey put 
Hannah down for a nap in a rear bedroom around 1:30 p.m.163  
Although day care providers are required to sleep infants in 
approved cribs164 and are advised to sleep infants on their backs,165 
Jeffrey placed Hannah on her stomach on top of a thick comforter 
on an adult bed.166  Around 2:00 p.m., Flohaug returned to the day 
care and began helping Jeffrey care for the children.167  Flohaug 
also took care of a toddler who fell and cut her forehead.168  
Around 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m., Jeffrey entered the bedroom where 
Hannah was sleeping to retrieve another child.169  Neither Jeffrey 
nor Flohaug checked on Hannah until 4:30 p.m. when Flohaug 
entered the bedroom to watch television.170  During a commercial 
 
23. 
 156. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. MINN. R. 9502.0425, subp. 9 (2005). 
 165. See Laska v. Anoka County, No. A05-315, 2005 WL 3470036, at *2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005), rev. denied, (Minn. Mar. 14, 2006). 
 166. Id. at *3. 
 167. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136-37. 
 168. Id. at 137. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  However, the court of appeals found that both the police report and 
coroner’s report state that Flohaug informed the police and coroner that 
“sometime between [3:30 and 4:00] she had gone into the bedroom and that she 
had heard the baby making some type of crying noise or was just making 
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break about ten minutes later, she rolled Hannah over and saw that 
Hannah had “a bluish tinge to the face” and that she was not 
breathing.171  Jeffrey performed CPR on Hannah, while Flohaug 
supervised the rest of the children.172  The paramedics arrived at 
the day care, but they were unable to resuscitate Hannah.173  
Hannah was pronounced dead at the hospital.174 
The Anoka County Coroner’s office determined that Hannah’s 
cause of death was Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) and that 
significant conditions contributing to Hannah’s death included 
“prone sleeping position on an adult-type bed.”175  Hannah was only 
ten weeks old when she died on August 21, 2000.176 
Laska commenced a wrongful death action alleging claims of 
negligence and negligence per se against Anoka County, Jeffrey, 
and Flohaug for the death of Hannah.177  Flohaug moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that she owed no duty of care to the 
children in the Jeffrey day care facility, including Hannah, that she 
had not breached any duty of care, and that there was no evidence 
she could have foreseen the harm that occurred to Hannah.178 
The district court granted Flohaug’s summary judgment 
motion.179  It ruled that Flohaug did not owe a duty to Hannah 
because no special relationship existed between Flohaug and 
Hannah.180  The district court also found that there was no 
evidence that Flohaug foresaw the risk of Hannah, an infant, being 
on an adult bed when she saw Hannah lying on the bed late in the 
afternoon.181  Laska appealed the district court’s ruling to the court 
of appeals.182 
In its opinion issued May 17, 2005, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling and found that Flohaug 
had assumed a duty of care to Hannah because she had accepted 
the entrustment of every child in the Jeffrey day care facility, 
 
nondescript noises in general.”  Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id.; see also Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 8. 
 173. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 137. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 136. 
 176. Id. at 136-37. 
 177. Id. at 137. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See generally Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 133. 
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thereby creating a special relationship with Hannah that day.183 
Courts have long recognized that an essential element of a 
negligence claim is that the defendant owed a legal duty of care to 
the plaintiff.184  As set out in detail above, Minnesota courts have 
held that, as a general rule, a person does not owe a duty to protect 
another from harm caused by third parties.185  However, a duty to 
protect can arise in certain cases based on two factors: “(1) the 
relationship of the parties, and (2) the foreseeability of the risk 
involved.”186 
A.   First Factor: Special Relationship 
Laska argued that a special relationship existed between 
Flohaug and Hannah because Hannah was a vulnerable infant in 
need of protection and because Flohaug had custody and control 
over Hannah’s care on August 21, 2000, while Hannah was present 
at the Jeffrey day care facility.187  Laska based her argument on 
Lundman v. McKown, which held that a duty to aid another person 
exists if there is a special relationship between the parties.188  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a special relationship 
arises when one person has “custody of another person under 
circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal 
opportunities of self-protection.”189 
The court of appeals in Laska relied on two cases, Donaldson v. 
Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth and Harper v. Herman, to 
determine when a plaintiff is considered to be a vulnerable person 
who is in need of protection from others.190  In Donaldson, the 
supreme court recognized that a duty may arise when “the plaintiff 
is in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent on the 
defendant, who in turn holds considerable power over the 
 
 183. Id. at 138-39. 
 184. Id. at 137-38 (citing Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 
1995)); see also Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722, 729 (Minn. 1990). 
 185. See supra Part II. 
 186. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 
127, 130 (Minn. 1999)). 
 187. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 12-13. 
 188. Id. at 12; Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995) (holding that a special relationship can arise among parties when a party is 
entrusted with the custody of a vulnerable dependent person). 
 189. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 
474 (Minn. 1993)). 
 190. Id.; see also Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 
N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995); Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474-75. 
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plaintiff’s welfare.”191  In contrast, a person who has the ability to 
protect himself or herself from harm is not vulnerable like in the 
Harper case where the plaintiff was an adult who knew how to 
protect himself from danger.192  Based on these cases, the Laska 
court recognized that a duty may be owed “where one person has 
‘custody of another person under circumstances in which that 
other person is deprived of normal opportunities of self-
protection.’”193 
Laska argued that Hannah was a vulnerable infant who was in 
need of protection and that her case was factually analogous to that 
of the ill child in Lundman where the court ruled various adults 
were in a special relationship with the child and, therefore, owed a 
duty to him.194  Laska contended that Hannah was similarly a 
vulnerable and dependent infant who had no ability to care for 
herself and who relied on the day care providers at the Jeffrey day 
care on August 21 to protect her because her parents were not 
present to provide any protection or care for Hannah.195 
Flohaug conceded to the court of appeals that Hannah was a 
vulnerable person.196  Based on Flohaug’s concession, the court of 
appeals concluded that under Andrade, Hannah was a vulnerable 
infant.197  In Andrade, the supreme court found that “small children 
in a licensed day care facility are a particular protected class . . . 
[that] consists of uniquely vulnerable persons: small children, often 
infants, left by their working parents in a home other than their 
own, and left in the care of another person for some period of less 
than 24 hours of the day.”198 
Because the parties did not dispute that Hannah was a 
vulnerable infant who was unable to protect herself, the only real 
 
 191. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792 (holding 
that low income housing facility had no special relationship with, and thus, no 
duty to protect a tenant from committing suicide)). 
 192. Id. at 138; see Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474-75 (holding that although boat 
owner was an experienced boater, the boat owner did not owe a duty to his social 
guest, a twenty-year-old man, to tell the guest that the water was too shallow to 
dive, because the social guest was not particularly vulnerable and did not lack the 
ability to protect himself). 
 193. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474). 
 194. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 13, Laska, 696 N.W.2d 133 (No. A04-1661); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 67 and 82 (analyzing Lundman,). 
 195. See Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 194, at 13. 
 196. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. (quoting Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 1986)). 
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issues the court needed to address to determine if a special 
relationship existed between Flohaug and Hannah were (1) 
whether Hannah’s safety had in some way been entrusted to 
Flohaug, and (2) whether Flohaug accepted the entrustment.199  
The court of appeals framed the issue as “whether, in offering to 
‘help’ her mother in the day care during the variance period 
beginning August 21, Flohaug accepted the entrustment of the 
care and custody of the entire group of dependent children, 
including Hannah.”200 
The court of appeals reviewed the district court’s decision to 
determine whether the district court erred in finding that Laska 
“did not entrust Hannah’s safety to Flohaug.”201  The district court 
had concluded, based on Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., that “[n]o 
relationship whatsoever existed between Flohaug and [Laska] or 
Hannah, much less a special relationship.202  The district court 
reasoned there was no special relationship between Hannah and 
Flohaug because Flohaug had never met Hannah or her mother 
prior to the date of Hannah’s death, Flohaug was not present when 
Hannah arrived that day at Jeffrey’s day care, and Flohaug was not 
present when Jeffrey placed Hannah on the bed for a nap.203  The 
court of appeals rejected the district court’s conclusion and ruled 
that Flohaug accepted the entrustment of every child in the day 
care on August 21, thereby assuming a duty of care to Hannah.204 
Flohaug argued on appeal that she should not have been 
expected to care for Hannah and created no special relationship 
with Hannah for several reasons, including (1) neither Laska nor 
Jeffrey had entrusted Hannah to her care, (2) she had no prior 
contact with Laska and was not present when Laska dropped 
Hannah off at the day care, (3) she lacked “a sufficient degree of 
contact” with Hannah on August 21, (4) Jeffrey never specifically 
addressed Hannah’s care with Flohaug, (5) Flohaug had never 
checked on sleeping infants in the past, (6) she was not in a 
 
 199. Id. at 138-39. 
 200. Id. at 138. 
 201. See Order and Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3. 
 202. Id.  As set out more fully above, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in 
Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 674 (Minn. 2001), that a landlord 
did not have a duty to protect a tenant from being murdered by intruders who 
entered the tenant’s apartment apparently due to broken locks on the security 
doors and intercoms that did not work. 
 203. See Order and Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3. 
 204. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138-39. 
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position to reject Hannah’s entrustment because she was never in a 
position to accept her entrustment, and (7) she never undertook 
Jeffrey’s duty of care to Hannah as evidenced by her lack of contact 
with Hannah.205  Moreover, Flohaug contended that the court 
should focus its review of whether a special relationship arose solely 
on Flohaug’s lack of interaction with Hannah and ignore the fact 
that Flohaug had provided care for other children in the day care 
on August 21.206 
In contrast, Laska argued on appeal that Flohaug had a special 
relationship with every child in the Jeffrey day care because under 
Erickson, the scope of her duty extended to every child, including 
Hannah, since each vulnerable child was left in the physical custody 
and control of Jeffrey and Flohaug on August 21.207  Laska also 
relied on Whittemore to support her argument that because Flohaug 
did not refuse to take care of any specific day care children, she 
accepted the entrustment of and therefore had a special 
relationship with all of the children in the day care on August 21.208  
 
 205. Brief and Appendix of Respondents Ginger R. Flohaug f/k/a Ginger R. 
Jeffrey & Joyce Jeffrey at 11-12, 16, 19-20, Laska, 696 N.W.2d 133 (No. A04-1661).  
Specifically, Flohaug argued that she did not see Hannah until after 4 p.m. when 
she went into the bedroom where Hannah was napping.  Id.  Flohaug relied on 
Lundman, arguing she, like the church committee member in that case, knew of 
the danger to the child but did not have a special relationship due to lack of 
sufficient contact with the child.  Id. at 15-18 (citing Lundman v. McKown, 530 
N.W.2d 807, 820-28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)).  She also contended that under 
Donaldson, knowledge of a potential harm to a person was not enough to create a 
legal duty of care to an individual because Flohaug must have a degree of control 
and dependency necessary to form a special relationship.  Id. at 16-18 (citing 
Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 790, 793 
(Minn. 1995)). 
 206. Id. at 12. 
 207. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 15-17.  Laska argued that the district 
court improperly relied on Funchess, which is distinguishable because that case 
considered whether a landlord had a duty to protect a tenant from the criminal 
acts of third persons.  Id. at 17-18.  Laska maintained that the analogous case of 
Lundman, which considered the duty owed to a vulnerable child in the custody 
and control of various adults, provided a more compelling precedent.  Id. at 15-18.  
In Erickson, the court held that a security company that agreed to provide security 
to the particular patrons of a parking ramp also owed a duty to protect all patrons 
on the premises of the ramp because the security company patrolled the entire 
parking ramp without limiting its patrol to the particular patrons’ vehicles.  
Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 170 (Minn. 1989). 
 208. Appellant’s Brief supra note 152, at 16-17.  Flohaug cared for an injured 
toddler during the afternoon on August 21 by providing her first aid after she 
tripped on some shoes.  Id. at 8.  Flohaug also testified during her deposition that 
she handled “chaos control” at the day care that day.  Id. at 7.  In Whittemore, the 
court held that a special relationship was not established between a trailer park 
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Finally, Laska contended that the proper test to determine the 
existence of a special relationship under Minnesota law is not the 
amount of contact Flohaug had with Hannah, but whether Flohaug 
had custody or control of Hannah.209 
The court of appeals agreed with Laska and found that 
Flohaug accepted the entrustment of every child in the Jeffrey day 
care facility because neither Jeffrey nor Flohaug restricted 
Flohaug’s care to any specific day care children and because 
Flohaug “subsequently acted in a manner consistent with that 
acceptance.”210  The court of appeals reasoned: 
[T]he record is clear that Flohaug specifically promised 
her mother that she would help in the day care during the 
variance period without indicating that her assistance 
would be restricted to specific children.  The record is 
also clear that Jeffrey placed no limitation on Flohaug’s 
function when she identified her to the county of the 
variance application as a “helper.”  There is no evidence—
and Flohaug does not assert—that Flohaug only agreed to 
care for certain children or rejected the entrustment of 
 
manager who knew that a sex offender lived at the trailer park, and sexually 
abused children who were residents of the trailer park. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. 
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 706-09 (Minn. 1996).  The court based its holding 
on the facts that the manager did not have custody of the children, did not 
exercise control over their safety, and rejected their entrustment by telling them 
to report the sexual abuse to their parents.  Id. at 708-09.   
  Laska also relied on persuasive cases from other jurisdictions that have 
recognized that babysitters assume a duty of care to the children for whom they 
agree to provide care.  Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 194, at 10; see Standifer 
v. Pate, 282 So. 2d 261, 262-65 (Ala. 1973) (holding that a volunteer babysitter who 
undertook the care of an eighteen-month-old child also had assumed a duty of 
care and was in turn liable for negligently supervising a child that pulled a skillet 
of hot grease off the counter and burned himself); Barbarishi v. Caruso, 135 A.2d 
539, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (holding that although a grandmother 
did not normally have a duty of care to protect her grandchildren from harm, the 
grandmother assumed this duty when she gratuitously agreed with the children’s 
mother to babysit those grandchildren and was liable when the grandson broke his 
arm in the washing machine while unsupervised); Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313, 
313-14 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that an uncle and aunt who gratuitously undertook 
the care of a young child, assumed a duty of reasonable care for the child and 
were liable for her injuries). 
 209. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 194, at 4.  Laska argued that 
Whittemore, Lundman, and Donaldson did not require any particular degree of 
contact for a special relationship to be established.  Id.  Rather, these cases 
required the party to be in the custody or control of the defendant.  Id.; see 
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 706-09; Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 813-24; Donaldson, 539 
N.W.2d at 789. 
 210. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 139-40. 
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any child or children.211 
Consequently, the court of appeals held “that Flohaug assumed a 
duty of care toward Hannah.”212 
The court of appeals also rejected Flohaug’s argument that she 
did not owe a duty to Hannah because she did not undertake the 
duties of Jeffrey to Hannah.213  The court of appeals found that 
Flohaug voluntarily undertook Jeffrey’s duty of care to every child 
in the Jeffrey day care facility that day, relying on the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 324A and Erickson.214  Section 324A provides 
that a defendant undertakes a duty of care to another when a 
“defendant . . . undertakes for another (whether gratuitously or for 
consideration) to perform a duty owed by the other to a third 
person.”215  The court of appeals reasoned that because Flohaug 
agreed to help Jeffrey care for Jeffrey’s day care children during 
the variance period, and because Jeffrey owed a duty to every child 
in the day care, the scope of Flohaug’s duty of care was the same as 
Jeffrey’s—a duty to care for every child in Jeffrey’s day care on 
August 21.216 
 
 211. Id. at 140 (citing Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708-09). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  Flohaug argued that none of the narrow situations outlined in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A applied to the facts of this case and that 
she never undertook Jeffrey’s duty to Hannah as evidenced by her lack of contact 
with Hannah.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 205, at 19-20.  She argued that her 
assistance of other children in the day care should be irrelevant when defining her 
relationship with Hannah because she did not provide any care to Hannah.  Id. 
 214. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 139 (quoting Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 
165, 170 (Minn. 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A 
(1965))).  In Erickson, the supreme court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 324A.  Id. at 139. 
 215. Id. (quoting Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 170).  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 324A provides 
[o]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another, which he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the 
third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise 
reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has 
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third 
person upon the undertaking. 
Minnesota courts have long recognized the principle that “one who assumes to 
act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting 
carefully . . . .”  State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 
(Minn. 1996); see also Walsh v. Pagra Air Taxi, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 567, 570-71 (Minn. 
1979). 
 216. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 139. 
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Flohaug further contended that, even if she did agree to help 
her mother with the day care, she did not owe a duty to Hannah 
because she did not have any “affirmative interaction” with Hannah 
prior to finding her not breathing on the bed, and thus she could 
not have established a special relationship with Hannah.217  The 
court of appeals also rejected this argument, reasoning that 
[i]t is true that an affirmative rejection of entrustment 
prevents a duty of care from arising as to specific 
individuals.  See Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708-09.  But 
Flohaug’s argument that affirmative interaction is 
required—in addition to a general acceptance of 
entrustment as to the day care—to trigger a special 
relationship between herself and Hannah is without legal 
support.218 
Instead, the court of appeals concluded that, as in Erickson, 
Flohaug’s interaction with certain children in the day care did not 
define the scope of her special relationship because she had 
generally accepted the entrustment of all of the children in the day 
care facility.219  “On the day of Hannah’s death, Flohaug performed 
various tasks, including administering first aid to the toddler who 
cut her head.  The record is clear she did not withhold care from 
any particular child or refuse to perform any necessary task as to 
any children.”220  The court of appeals therefore ruled that Flohaug 
did have a special relationship with Hannah because she 
“voluntarily accepted the custody and control of a group of 
vulnerable individuals—including Hannah . . . .”221 
B.   Second Factor: Foreseeability of Risk Involved 
The court of appeals next considered whether the second 
factor regarding the foreseeability of the risk of harm to Hannah 
could be decided as a matter of law by the courts.222  “In 
determining whether a danger of injury is foreseeable, courts must 
consider whether it is objectively reasonable to expect that the 
specific danger will result in injury, not simply whether it was within 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 139. 
 219. Id. at 139-40. 
 220. Id. at 140. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
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the realm of any conceivable possibility.”223  The courts are unable 
to resolve this issue as a matter of law when the issue is a close 
case.224 
Laska argued it was objectively foreseeable that harm or injury 
to Hannah could occur if Flohaug did not supervise Hannah.225  
The Minnesota Supreme Court held in Austin v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. that when a court is determining whether a risk of 
harm is foreseeable, the court must consider the harm that one 
should anticipate and not merely the harm that actually 
occurred.226  Laska argued that Flohaug did not need to foresee the 
particular injury that occurred to Hannah, only that it could be 
anticipated that an injury would likely result from Flohaug’s 
negligent act or failure to act.227  Laska relied on Andrade, the 
numerous protections the legislature has provided for infants in 
day cares, and Flohaug’s knowledge that children had previously 
been injured in Jeffrey’s day care, to support her contention that 
the risk of harm to Hannah was foreseeable to Flohaug when 
Flohaug left Hannah unsupervised for hours in an overcrowded 
day care.228   
 
 223. Id. (citing Whiteford by Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A, 582 
N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998)).  The district court found that Flohaug did not 
foresee the risk of harm of Hannah’s sleeping on an adult bed until she found 
Hannah not breathing on the bed.  See Order and Memorandum, supra note 4. 
 224. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 140. 
 225. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 205, at 21. 
 226. Austin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 Minn. 214, 217, 152 N.W.2d 136, 138 
(1967). 
 227. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 137-38 (citing Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 
398, 401 (Minn. 1995)). 
 228. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 25 (citing Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 
N.W.2d 836, 844 (Minn. 1986) (recognizing that when a day care is overcrowded 
with very young children, “such overcrowding is per se dangerous”) (Wahl, J., 
concurring)).  The State of Minnesota has promulgated regulations for the 
purpose of protecting vulnerable infants in licensed day care facilities, including 
requiring caregivers to provide constant supervision of infants.  See MINN. R. 
9502.0325, subp. 1 (2003).  Minnesota Rule 9502.0315, subpart 29a, requires a 
caregiver to be “within sight or hearing of an infant, toddler, or preschooler at all 
times so that the caregiver is capable of intervening to protect the health and 
safety of the child.”   In contrast, the legislature requires less supervision of older 
children: “For the school age child, [supervision] means a caregiver being 
available for assistance and care so that the child’s health and safety is protected.”  
MINN. R. 9502.0315, subp. 29a.  Laska asked that the court determine if these 
regulations showed that the risk of harm to Hannah was objectively foreseeable to 
Flohaug if she left Hannah unsupervised for hours.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 
152, at 11; see also Kuhl v. Heinen, 672 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) 
(recognizing that knowledge of the danger meets the foreseeability requirement). 
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Flohaug argued she did not foresee any danger in Hannah 
sleeping on her stomach on an adult bed because she had not 
received any training on SIDS risk factors.229  She further 
contended she did not know that Jeffrey’s day care was 
overcrowded because she did not know it was overcapacity on 
August 21.230 
The court of appeals determined that because of the 
meritorious arguments of both parties, the issue of foreseeability 
was not so clear that the court could decide the issue as a matter of 
law.231 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals’ ruling in Laska closely followed the 
precedents established by the prior rulings of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals.  Public policy 
and the prior case law strongly support Laska’s arguments and the 
court of appeals’ ruling that there was a special relationship 
between Flohaug and Hannah resulting in a duty of care being 
owed to Hannah.232  The purpose behind the legislature’s 
regulation of licensed day care facilities is to ensure the safety and 
well-being of children in day care.233  Laska successfully argued to 
the court that parents should be able to entrust the care of their 
children to day care facilities and know that their children will be 
safe and properly cared for.234  Though Minnesota appellate courts 
rarely find cases in which they will impose a duty to protect, the 
compelling facts in this case dictated that such a duty must be 
found. 
The Laska ruling will not result in a duty being owed by all 
persons and family members who live in licensed day care facilities, 
as Flohaug argued at the court of appeals.  Instead, the ruling 
simply affirms previously established law regarding the duty that 
arises when a defendant has custody and control of a vulnerable 
person who lacks the ability for self-protection, and the defendant 
voluntarily agrees to assume a duty of care for that vulnerable 
person.  The court of appeals’ decision upholds the public’s 
 
 229. Brief of Respondents, supra note 205, at 14. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 141. 
 232. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 27. 
 233. Id. (citing MINN. R. 9502.0325, subp.1). 
 234. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 141. 
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expectation that a person who agrees to provide care to children in 
a day care is liable for her failure to exercise reasonable care when 
caring for those children. 
Following Hannah’s death, her parents have fought an uphill 
battle to obtain justice for their daughter and to ensure that her 
death results in legal changes that ensure the protection of other 
vulnerable children in day care facilities throughout the State of 
Minnesota.235  Through her battle in the courts, Laska’s tragedy has 
captured media attention that has resulted in legislative change.  
On Sunday, April 24, 2005, Laska’s tragedy was outlined in a front-
page story in the Star Tribune newspaper as part of a story about 
safety issues surrounding Minnesota’s licensed day care facilities.236  
Laska stated that “[w]e brought this lawsuit . . . for justice for 
Hannah . . . [a]nd in hopes we can prevent this from happening to 
someone else’s family.”237  This newspaper story brought to the 
forefront issues facing parents who expect their children to be 
monitored, supervised, and safe in day cares that are licensed by 
the government.  As stated on the Star Tribune editorial page: 
Minnesotans go about life assuming that their state is 
 
 235. There was a second appeal in Laska after the district court granted a 
motion for summary judgment to the defendants Anoka County and the licensing 
worker who inspected Jeffrey’s day care facility prior to Hannah’s death, citing 
Jeffrey for numerous rule violations, including sleeping Hannah on an adult bed 
instead of in an approved crib.  The district court ruled as a matter of law that, 
because Anoka County could not have shut down Jeffrey’s day care in time to 
prevent Hannah’s death, Laska could not prove that the county caused Hannah’s 
death.  See Laska v. Anoka County, No. A05-315, 2005 WL 3470036, at *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005), rev. denied, (Minn. Mar. 14, 2006).  Laska argued on 
appeal that there were facts in dispute; namely, whether monitoring of the day 
care by the county would have deterred the ongoing rule violations and that this 
precluded summary judgment on the issue of causation.  Id.  The court of appeals 
agreed and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
county and the licensing worker and remanded the case for trial.  Id. at *8.  In the 
second appeal, Jeffrey also challenged the district court’s denial of her motion for 
summary judgment when she argued that the opinion of Laska’s medical expert 
was not admissible because there was no known organic cause of SIDS and it is not 
generally accepted that the risk factors of sleeping infants on their stomachs on 
soft surfaces like adult beds can be said to be the “cause” of a SIDS death.  Id. at 
*6.  The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling that the testimony of 
Laska’s medical expert regarding SIDS risk factors is admissible.  Id.  Jeffrey 
thereafter petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review, but this petition 
was denied.  Order, Laska v. Anoka County, No. A05-315, 2005 WL 3470036 
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005). 
 236. Jean Hopfensperger, Star Tribune Special Report Examining Daycare: Child 
Care, How Safe?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 24, 2005, at 1A. 
 237. Id. 
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safer, cleaner and more regulated than most places.  So 
for many it came as a shock to open last Sunday’s paper 
and read a special report on child care which disclosed 
that in Minnesota a day-care center can remain open even 
after 73 license violations, that an adult can open a day-
care operation without knowing even the most basic 
hazards of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome and that the 
state requires less training to open a home day-care 
business than to become a manicurist. . . .  
[I]t is plain from Sunday’s report that Minnesota now 
lags behind many of its neighbors. 
This state of affairs is especially galling in Minnesota.  
The state regularly leads the nation in the proportion of 
working mothers, with nearly three out of four mothers of 
preschoolers holding jobs outside the home.  These 
women make a huge contribution to the state’s economy, 
and it’s disturbing that the state can’t guarantee that their 
children will be safe while they are at work.238 
The public attention from this media coverage led the 
Minnesota Legislature to pass a law in July 2005 that requires day 
cares to prominently post correction orders issued by the counties 
that document rule violations at day care facilities so that parents 
are better informed about the quality of care their children are 
receiving in those day care facilities.239  The new law also requires 
additional training for day care providers, and “the state will work 
to post day care safety records online by early [2006].”240  
Legislators pushed through these changes in the law because 
providing additional information to parents about licensed day 
cares “is critical” based on this state having “one of the highest rates 
of working mothers in the nation.”241 
The Laska ruling supports this state’s sound public policy of 
establishing laws that will increase the safety of infants and young 
children in licensed day care facilities. 
 
 
 238. Editorial, Child Care Quality:  Gaps in the Minnesota System, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 27, 2005, at 16A. 
 239. See Jean Hopfensperger, Change for Child Care: New Laws Aim to Enhance 
Safety by Beefing up Licensing Rules in State, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jul. 15, 
2005, at 1A; Editorial, supra note 238, at 16A; see also Omnibus Health and Human 
Services Finance Bill, ch. 4, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law, 1st Spec. Sess. 
 240. See Hopfensperger, supra note 236. 
 241. Id. 
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